Utopia for Realists: And How We Can Get There

Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build the Ideal World, originally published in 2014, was written by Dutch historian Rutger Bregman. As a writer for the Dutch online journal De Correspondent, Bregman gained attention for advocating a universal basic income, an idea also associated with French economist Thomas Piketty.

After publishing a series of essays on the topic, Bregman decided to write a book on how contemporary ideas are often dismissed simply on the basis of their being utopian. He finds this problematic both because it assumes that anything utopian is by definition impracticable, or even dangerous, and that this assumption marginalizes proposals, leading to their dismissal for the sole reason that they propose major changes to existing structures. The book’s title is meant to soften the imagined tension between an idealized vision of how things could or should be and a grim recognition of how they are. Without downplaying the seriousness and complexity of modern problems, Bregman commits to the proposition that ideas can be powerful enough to generate immense changes—and that among the most important ideas is humans’ capacity to improve their condition.

This summary refers to the English translation of the Amazon Kindle edition (New York: Hachette, 2018).

Summary

The book begins by describing why utopian thinking has fallen out of fashion. Bregman describes the modern, developed world as a plentiful place where the average quality of human life vastly exceeds the historical average. People live longer, in much greater comfort, and have vastly more choices regarding how to spend their time than in past eras. Nearly anyone who lived before the 20th century would regard current conditions as paradise on Earth. For that reason, people have lost faith in the capacity for further changes, aside from making minor fixes to defects within existing structures. The result has been a collective ennui, or complacency, brought on by the dread that this is as good as it will ever be—and that it will likely only get worse. Bregman worries that this will become a self-fulfilling prophecy and thus turns to several policy proposals that may not be magical fixes but have enough supporting evidence to earn a place in respectable discourse rather than be dismissed as impossible dreams.

The first idea that Bregman discusses is providing free money, also known as a universal basic income. This idea defies the widely held assumption that money for nothing will incentivize laziness and that only work or the active search for work merits income or financial assistance. Bregman cites actual efforts to give money to the poor that have worked out fantastically well, proving that the objection is based on a bias against the poor rather than a conclusion derived from empirical evidence. Giving people money, which they then use to improve their own economic standing, is less expensive and more productive than byzantine schemes of determining eligibility for welfare. People respond well to being treated with dignity.

Bregman’s second idea is a 15-hour work week. Economists have long predicted that automation would shorten the work week, but in the last half century that trend has halted and even reversed itself. Modern capitalism enshrines the commitment to work as the ultimate sign of character, and with the advent of feminism, all adults are now expected to take part while also attending to the other responsibilities in their lives. Reducing the average work week from 40 to 15 hours may sound absurd, but similar arguments were made against the 40-hour work week, which factory owners ultimately accepted when they realized that better-rested workers were happier, more loyal, and more productive. Whether today’s chief executive officers (CEOs) can exhibit the same degree of forethought as those of the early 20th century remains to be seen, but putting the idea in circulation is a good start.

Third, Bregman proposes open borders—the free movement of people, capital, goods, and services across national boundaries (a smaller version of which now exists within the European Union). Strict national boundaries are a relatively new concept born of overreaction to security concerns, and they have created far more waste and inflicted more violence than they have prevented. Dropping all restrictions may not be feasible, but gradually lifting them has the potential to make the global economy both richer and more equitable—and ease the bitter tensions between the developed and developing worlds.

With each of these ideas, Bregman is proposing an ideal that may never become fully realized, which makes them utopian. However, they are also realistic insofar as they can provide a wellspring for more productive thinking and action on policy, rather than a knee-jerk dismissal of any serious alternative as infeasible.